

DOES PĀṆINI'S KĀRAKA SYSTEM PROVIDE A BASIS
FOR A UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR?

Illustrated by reference to the Nāsadiya Sūkta and Upaniṣads

In this paper we shall be particularly concerned with the possible relation between Pāṇini's seven fundamental «*kāraka*» *sūtras* and Universals we find preeminently expressed in the *Veda*, especially in the *Jñāna Khanda*, the *Upaniṣads*. Since we shall only be focussing on one of the eight main forms of *Pratyaya* presented in Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, viz the *Sup Vibhakti Pratyaya*, case endings, this will inevitably be a very partial view on the Grammar as a whole and on its possible Universal reference. In spite of this, it is our conviction that this first systematic description of the laws of language known in the world, even today has an enormously important contribution to make to our understanding of the cosmos of the sentence, especially the function of *kārakas* or cases in relation to the *kriyā* or verb, to manifesting some aspect of the unmanifest *śabda-brahman*.

In contrast to the concept of case, Latin *casus* from Greek *ptosis* meaning a falling away from the vertical position of the *onoma*, noun proper, is this far deeper and richer concept of *Kāraka* which points to the sentence as the cosmos of meaning in which the *kārakas* are the means of accomplishing the unmanifest one activity. The Stoics fixed the use of the term case as we have it today. The nominative was the «upright case», *orthē* or *eutheia ptosis* and the rest were «oblique» *plagiai*. They were grouped together as oblique because in at least some of their uses there was prominent not only the meaning of the noun but a particular relation between it and another word or words (usually verbs, prep-

ositions or another noun). Aristotle had not regarded what we call the «Nominative» case as a case at all. He distinguished between *onoma*, the noun proper (in its nominative case) and its derivatives which included (in our terms) its oblique cases (c.f. I. BEKKE, *Aristotle*, Vol. 1, p. 104). We know that (after Aristotle), the Stoics had five cases: nominative, accusative, dative, genitive and one other. If it was not the vocative, it must be that the adverb was regarded as a case by some Stoic grammarians. The vocative would be a separate noun form by itself. The question must be left open on the evidence available. So too must the origin of the word *ptosis* literally meaning 'fall'. (cf. R.H. ROBBINS, «Ancient & Medieval Grammatical Theory in Europe»).

In contrast is *Pāṇini's* system which R.H. Robbins says is «of more merit than any single work on grammar in ancient or medieval Europe». If we accept *Kāraṇa* as giving a profound connection with the *Veda* and with the concept that «from rest, Om, to rest 'Om', the whole creation, *kr/kriyā* is an act of love» (*vibhakti*), we may validly connect the laws of language to the source.

The *sup pratyayas* taken in conjunction with the deep structure *kāraṇas* would form the basis of a totally fresh view on the parts of the sentence, seen as applicable to all languages. Just as the twenty one *sup vibhakti* may at the surface level represent all possible endings, even though not manifest at any one time, so too the concepts underlying those *pratyayas* «*apādāna*, *sampradāna*, *karaṇa*, *adhikaraṇa*, *karman* and *karṭṛ*» may be viewed as present though not necessarily manifest in every sentence.

This group of *pratyayas* is headed by an *adhikāra sūtra* «*nyāp-prātipadikāt*» IV.1.1. After what ends with the feminine terminations *ñi* or *āp*, or after a *prātipadika* («*arthavad-adhātu apratyayaḥ prātipadikam*» I.4.45. «*kṛt-taddhitasamāsaśca*» I.4.46.) act the *pratyayas* «*su-au-jaś*, *am-aut-śas*, *ṭā-bhyām-bhis*, *ṇasi-bhyām-bhyas*, *ṇas-os-ām*, *ṇi-os-sup*» IV.1.2.

Coming after a *prātipadika* or feminine ending, these twenty one *pratyayas* and their substitutes serve to manifest the four universal relations and the two particular relations to the one activity, as we may describe the system of the six *kāraṇas*. We shall attempt to illustrate each of these in a sentence showing the contrast to the Greek system. As was stated, this has as its central concept the

'upright or nominative form of the noun' from which all else is said to be a falling away, whereas in the Pāṇinian system we see that all six concepts are «in relation to the action» *kārake* I.4.25. Such action correctly perceived in any sentence, is part of the one activity *kriyā* which manifests from rest to rest.

It has been stated that the first *sūtra* Pāṇini gives is *Kārake* I.4.23. «In relation to the action». Following Patanjali's interpretation on I.4.23., we will consider the term *kārake* as a *sañjñā*/technical name *sūtra* since it has its place in the *ekasañjñā* section P.I.4.1.-P.II.2.38., even though it is mentioned in the *adhikarana*/locative.

Bh. No. 4 on I.4.23. «*sañjñādhikāraścāyaṃ tatra kim-anyacchakyam vijñātum-ataḥ sañjñāyāḥ*. We may assume with S.D. Joshi¹ that the term *kāraka* was indeed a well known technical name in the time of Pāṇini and therefore there was no need to specifically introduce it as such with the first *vibhakti* *su/au* or *jas*, *karṭṛ* or Nominative, as he does with other *sañjñā*, technical terms like P.III.1.1. *Pratyayah* etc.

Patañjali explains *kāraka* in its literal sense. The *dhātu* (*ḍhu*)-*kr-(ñ)* *karāṇe* 'in the sense of making, doing or effecting', is followed by the *pratyaya* *ṇvul* in the sense of agent by P.III.1.133. «*ṇvul-tr̥cau*» «The *pratyayas* *ṇvul* and *tr̥c* act after any *dhātu* in the sense of agent» and P.III.4.67 «*kartari kṛt*» «A *pratyaya* called *kṛt* acts in the sense of Agent», *nvul* becoming transformed to *aka* by P.VII.1.1. «*yuvoranākau*», *kr* to *Kār* by P.VII.2.115 *aco kṛiti* and P.I.1.51. «*uran raparaḥ*», and finally to *kārake* by VI.1.87. *ād-guṇaḥ*. Therefore *kāraka* «that which effects or brings about» *karoti iti kārakah*. For example when it is said *devadattaḥ sthālāyām odanaṃ kṣāṭhaiḥ pacati*.

«*Devadatta* cooks the rice in a pot with fuel», *Devadatta*, the rice, the pot and the fuel are *kārakas* in relation to the action of cooking, since each of them in its own peculiar way is instrumental in effecting or making manifest the action. Hence it is first to be taken as in *anvartha sañjñā*, a term whose meaning is intelligible in itself (in contrast to such technical terms as *bha*, *ghu* etc.).

1. S.D. JOSHI, *Patañjali's Vyākaraṇa Mahābhāṣya - Kārakāhnikā*, and ????

Patañjali restricts the application of *kārake* to the following six *sañjñās*; *apādāna*, *sampradāna*, *karaṇa*, *adhikaraṇa*, *karman* and *karṭṛ* by taking it as an *adhikara* or governing *sūtra*. He then says «*kriyāyām iti kārake*». «*Kārake* means in connection or relation to the action, which completes his comment on the first *vārttika* of P.I.4.23. — «*sādhakamnirvartakam-kārakasañjñam bhāvatīti vaktavyam*» «It should be stated that the technical name *kāraka* is that which is *sādhaka*/instrumental in accomplishing (the action) or *nirvartaka* «bringing to an end i.e. performing or accomplishing (the action)».

What is this *kriyā* or action *sādhya*/to be accomplished? The *Pāṇinian* system here simply gives hints when it is said by *Pāṇini* I.3.1. «*bhūvādayo dhātavaḥ*» and *Kātyāyana* interprets these as *kriyāvācinaḥ*. «*Dhātus*» are those elements expressing verbal activity. These activities are said to be of two kinds, according to *Patañjali* on III.1.35. «*kāspratyayād-ām-amantra liṭi*» *sāmānya* «general» like *bhū* etc. and *viśeṣa* «particular» like *pac* (to cook) etc. The *dhātu-pāṭha* attributed to the *Pāṇinian* school says *bhū sattāyām*. 'In existence or pure being one finds the nature of *bhū*', suggesting that in fact all the infinite variety of activities arise from one, the one fundamental activity we call pure being or consciousness. From rest, that is «*Om*» or the *Śabda-brahman* to rest, «*Om*» the whole creation *dhātu kṛ* forming the one *kriyā*, is an act of *Prema* — Love *vibhakti*. As the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* puts it «*yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante yena jātāni jīvanti yatprayanti abhisamviśanti tad vijijñāsasva tad-brahmeti*». «That from which all these beings take birth, that by which they live after being born, that towards which they move and into which they move, that one should crave to know. That is *Brahman*».

Here we see reflected the four Universal *kāraka* which *Pāṇini* expounds in the ensuing *sūtras*. «*Yataḥ*» is *apādāna*, «*yena*» is *karaṇa*, «*yat prayanti*» may be taken as equivalent perhaps to «*yam abhipraiti*» (whom one intends to connect with in the mind) *sampradāna* and «*yat abhisamviśanti*» being equivalent to the *adhikaraṇa*.

The second, *Brahma Sūtra* «*janmādyasya yataḥ*» is obviously alluding to the same fundamental source or one activity which *Yāska* then distinguishes into the six basic forms of becoming hav-

ing first stated «*bhāvapradhānam-ākhyātam. satvapradhānāni nāmāni*» I.I. Nirukta he says: «*śad-bhāvavikārā bhavantīti vārsyāyanih. jāyate'sti viparināmate'paksīyate vinaśyatīti*» I.2.

This one activity or Word is surely that spoken of in St. John's Gospel Ch.I.v.I. «In the beginning was the Word. And the Word was with God and the Word was God. All things were made by Him and without Him was not anything made that was made. In Him was Light and the Light was the life of men. And the light shineth in the darkness and the darkness comprehends it not».

The Greek «Logos» here becomes the Latin «*Verbum*» whence the two words in English «Word» and «Verb». So the verbe in every sentence is the reflection or finest manifestation of the Logos, Word or «*Śabda-brahman*». As the *Māndukyopaniṣad* puts it «*Om ityetad-akṣaram idam sarvam. Tasyopavyākhyānam bhūtam bhavadbhaviṣyad-iti sarvam om kāra eva. Yat cānyat trikālātītam tadapi om-kāra eva*» (1). *Sarvam hyetad-brahman ayam-ātmā brahma so'yam ātmā catuspāt*» (2). «His syllable «Om», The Word, is this whole universe. This is an exposition of That, Past, Present, Future. All is the syllable «Om», the Word, alone (1). For all this universe is *Brahman*, the Absolute. This Self, *Ātman* is *Brahman*. That Self has four quarters» (2).

Or as *Bhartrhari* puts it in the first verse of *Vākyapadiya* «*Anādinidhanam brahma śabdatatvam yad akṣaram. vivartate'rthabhāvena prakriyā jagato yatah.*

«That Beginningless and endless one, the *Brahman*, of which the essential nature is the Word. The Imperishable which manifests itself the being of all things and from whence is the creation for the universe».

Or again we may see here «*tad-ekam*» as another expression of that «Word» in the *Nāsadiya Sūkta*.

«*Nāsadāsīn-no sadāsīt-tadānīm nāsīd-rajo no vyomā paro yat. Kim āvarīvaḥ kūha kasya śarman āmbhaḥ kimāsīd-gāhanam gabhīram*».

«Then what is not, was not; what is, was not:

The intervening divine motion of

Creation was not: nor yet the expanse

Of heaven to shelter that motion. Was

It hid? Where? By whose enveloping care? Was it water, the

fathomless abyss?».

The first «universal» relation to the action is expounded in the next *sūtra* «*dhruvam-apāye'pādānam*». I.4.24. «In moving away from the Eternal Unmoving, from which all movement comes, there is the *apādāna* (ablative)». «That fixed point which is the limit denoted by a word dependent on the verb is called the limit of ablation in relation to the action, when moving away is to be accomplished».

Dhruvam yad-apāyayuktam apāye sādhye yad-avadhibhūtam tat kārakam apādānasañjñam bhavati (Kāś.vr.on I.4.24).

«*Apādāne pañcamī*» II.3.28.

When the word denotes the «Eternal Unmoving» (from which movement comes) the fifth *sup-vibhakti-pratyaya*/case is employed i.e. *ñasi* is replaced by *āt* when the *prātīpadika* ends in a short *a*. Thus for example «*Pūrṇāt-pūrṇam-udacyate*». «The pure, perfect and complete *saguna*, conditioned *Brahman* proceeds from the Pure, perfect and complete unconditioned, *nirguna Brahman*».

The Greek and Latin concepts of ablation, «carrying away from», lacks the reference to the unmoving source and therefore is not so universal.

The very use of the word *dhruvam* by Pāṇini may, itself be taken as a clue to the universal reference of Pāṇini's system, its connection with the *Veda*, and cannot be divorced from the meaning of that word as found in the *Upaniṣads*. That Eternal Unmoving is the very source of the one activity which the *kārakas* are instrumental in accomplishing or manifesting. As the *Nāsadiya Sūkta* puts it,

«*tasmād-dhānyan-na paraḥ kim canāsa*».

«Of a certainty, beyond that was none other» (v. 2.).

«*kuta ājāta kuta iyam viśṛṣṭiḥ*».

«Whence born, whence this detailed Self-expression?» (v.6.).

«*iyam viśṛṣṭir-yata ābabhūva*».

«Whence this detailed Self-radiance came... (who is of this the witness, knows whether. He knows or not)» (v. 7.).

«*Yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante*» Tait.III.1.1. «That from which all these beings take birth...».

In the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* I.5.14. we hear «*dhruvaivasya ṣoḍaśī kalā*». «Night and day are His fifteen days and the Eternal

Unmoving is His sixteenth *kalā* or aspect. Again we find at II.9.24. «*kim devato'syām dhruvāyām diśyasit*. «What deity art thou identified with in the eternal unmoving direction above?».

The third example in the *Bṛhad* is found at IV.4.20.:

«*ekadhaivānudraṣṭavyam-etad-apramayam dhruvam virajah para ākāśād-aja ātmā mahān-dhruvah*».

«It should be realised in one form only, (for) It is unknowable and Eternal.

The Self is taintless, beyond the (subtle) space, birthless, infinite/great and Unmoving constant/indestructible».

In the *Chāndogyopaniṣad* VII.4.3. we hear «*lokān dhruvān dhruvaḥ abhiṣīdhyati*». «(Who meditates on will as *Brahman*) attains the eternal worlds by himself becoming eternal» and again at VII.26.2. «*satvaśuddhau dhruvā smṛtiḥ*» «In the purification of the inner organ of mind arises the eternal or unfailing memory».

Finally in the *Kaṭhopaniṣad* we find three famous references. At II.10.:

«*jānāmyaham śevadhir-ityanityam na hyadhruvaiḥ prāpyate hi dhruvam tat tato mayā nāciketaś-citognir anityair-dravyaiḥ prāptavān-asmi nityam*».

«(Since) I know that this treasure is impermanent — for that eternal unmoving cannot be attained through impermanent things — therefore (knowingly) did I pile up the *Naciketa* fire with impermanent things, and have (thereby) attained (relative) permanence».

At III.15.:

«*aśabdam-asparśam-arūpam-avyayam tathā'rasam nityam-agandhavat-ca yat. anādyanantam mahataḥ param dhruvam nicāyā tān-mṛtyumukhāt pramucyate*».

«One becomes freed from the jaws of death by knowing that which is soundless, touchless, colourless, undiminishing, and also tasteless, eternal, odourless, without beginning and without end, distinct from *Mahat* and ever constant/Unmoving».

and finally at IV.2.:

«*parācaḥ kāman-anuyanti bālāste mṛtyur-yanti vitatasya pāśam atha dhīrā amṛtatvam viditvā dhruvam-adhruveṣviha na prārthayante*».

The unintelligent people follow the external desires. They get

entangled in the snares of the widespread death. Therefore the discriminating people, having known what Eternal true immortality is in the midst of impermanent things, do not pray for anything here».

Apādāna is then the first of the four great universals. The Eternal Unmoving from which movement arises is to be found either expressed or unmanifest in every sentence by asking the question «whence does this activity arise?» Whether it is expressed by a preposition like «from» in English or by a *pratyaya* the concept it would seem is always present.

The second «Universal» we may likewise consider as formulated by *Pāṇini* at I.4.32.:

«*karmanā yam-abhipraiti sa sampradānam*».

«Whom one intends to connect with in the mind by means of the *karman*/object (be it a gift offering of sacrifice) that very person is *sampradāna*/ the recipient or dative, in relation to the action».

Again it is evident that the concept of dative while connecting with giving is flat by comparison with the *Pāṇinian* formulation neither bringing out either the intention of the mind nor the relation to the one activity.

By «*caturthī sampradāne*» II.3.13.

The fourth case *vibhaktipratyayas ne, bhyām* and *bhyas* are employed when the sense is that of *sampradāna* or recipient to whom, the action is dedicated. For example «*paramātmāne namaḥ*» «A bow to the Supreme Self».

The second great universal implies that every action takes place with some intention in the mind to connect with some power, to which that action is dedicated. This may be consciously expressed as dedication of the action to some universal power be it godly or demonic or it may simply be implied but never expressed. We may say the concept of «that to which the action is dedicated» is universally applicable to all sentences. When not specifically manifest or expressed in a sentence, it will be revealed simply by asking the question «To what is this action dedicated?» Again this may be conveyed by a preposition «to, for» etc. or by a *pratyaya*.

In the *Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad* I.4. we find «*abhipraiti*» twice:

«*Brahma vidvān brahmābhipraiti... brahma vidvān brahmaivā-*

bhipraiti».

«A knower of *Brahman* approaches unto *Brahman* with his mind... (Devoid of good deeds devoid of evil deeds) a knower of *Brahman* unto very *Brahman* goes with his mind».

In the same *Upaniṣad* we find the word *sampradāna* at II.15.:

«*Athātaḥ pitāputrīyam sampradānam*».

«Now next, the father and son ceremony, the transmission or act of giving». Cf. also *Bṛhad* I.5.17-20 *sampratti*.

One famous example of its application will suffice from *Bṛhad* IV.5.6.:

«*na vā are patyuh kāmāya patiḥ priyo bhavati ātmanas tu kāmāya patiḥ priyo bhavati*».

«It is not for the sake of the husband, my dear, that he is loved but for the sake of the Self/*ātman* that he is loved...».

We may reasonably consider the *karaṇa* or instrument as the third «universal» following Pāṇini's formulation «*sādhakatamam karaṇam*» I.4.42. «That which is most direct effective or propitious for accomplishing the action is the *karaṇa* or Instrument». By «*kartṛkaraṇayos-tritīyā*» II.3.18. «When the agent and instrument are not specified by the termination of the verb (i.e. when the verb is not in agreement with them) the third case or *sup-vibhaktipratyayas tā, bhyām* and *bhis* are employed». For example «*iśā vāsyam idaṃ sarvaṃ*». *Īśā*.1. «All this (universe) is to be covered by the Lord (the, Supreme Self)».

The third universal is perhaps more obviously applicable to every sentence whether expressed or not, since we are more conscious of the fact that there is no action that can be accomplished without an instrument, in the very nature of things. Clearly of all the *kārakas* it is that most directly instrumental. That immediately bringing about the action directly functions in that capacity. It would seem that in all languages this «instrument» would be revealed simply by asking the question «By what means is the action accomplished?».

The word *Karaṇa* is to be found in the *Śvetāsvatarapāṇiṣad* at VI.8.:

«*na tasya kāryam karaṇam ca vidyate na tat-samaścābhyadhikaś ca drśyate. parā'sya saktir-vividhaiva śrūyate sva-*

bhāvikiññanabalakriyā ca».

«No action or instrument/organ of His is found; There is not seen His equal or superior; His higher power (*śakti*) is revealed to be various indeed and innate is the working of His intelligence and strength».

The word is also found used in the *Maitrī Upaniṣad* at III.3.:

«*Yañ kartā so'yaṁ vai bhūtātma karanaiḥ kārayatā'ntaḥ puruṣaḥ*».

«Verily, he who is the doer is the elemental soul; the causer of action through the instruments/organs is the inner Person».

We may see this *kāraka* clearly illustrated in the *Nāsadiya Sūkta*:

«*anīd-avātam svadhayā tad-ekam*».

«Without aid of breath, by inherent might. That one breathed» (v. 2.).

«*tama āsīt-tamasā gūḍham-agre*».

«In the beginning pregnant darkness was by dissolving darkness secretly enfolded» (v. ?.).

«*tucchyenā bhyapihitam yad-āsīt tapasas-tan-mahinajāyatai-kam*».

«While the boundless source of being was by unformed being thus enclosed, That one through the light of knowledge, brought itself forth to be» (v. 3.).

«*hṛdi pratiṣyā kavayo manīṣā*».

«By the power of mind the poets penetrated the heart» (v. 4.).

«*arvāg-devā asya visarjanena*».

«Of this, the Gods limitedly, reverently are, By (in) virtue of this flowing utterance» (v. 6.).

The fourth «universal» is called Locative in the Greek/Latin tradition but *Pāṇini* gives as his formulation «*ādhāro'dhikaraṇam*» I.4.45.

«The substratum, substance or container of the action is the *adhikaraṇa*, the location in time and space, where the action takes place».

By the *sūtra* «*saptamyadhikaraṇe ca*» II.3.36.

«When the sense is that of location, the seventh case *supvibhaktipratyayās ni, os* and *sup.* act after a *prātipadika* or feminine

ending in *i* or *pa*». For example:

«*yas-tu sarvāṇi bhūtāny ātmany evānupaśyati sarvabhūteṣu cātmānam tato na vijugupsate*» *Īśā.6.*

«He who sees all creatures in Himself Himself in all creatures feels no hatred».

The universal nature of this *kāraka* is again obvious. To reveal it when not expressed one simply asks «in what does this action take place?». *Pāṇini* again uses words which directly connect with the universal, with the concept of the one substance «In Him we live and move and have our being» (as it is put in Acts of the Apostles 17.28.). The concept again may be expressed by a preposition «in» etc. or by a *pratyaya*.

We find this word «*ādhāra*» in the *Maitrī Upaniṣad* VI.36. «*yacchāntam tasyādhāram kham*». Now of that which is the tranquil (form of the light *Brahman*) space is the substance or substratum». «*vartyādhārasnehayogād-imaṁ sthitavātmāsuci tathā*».

«As the existence of a lamp is because of the combination of wick, substratum or support and oil so (these two, the Self and the bright sun exist because of the combination of the inner one and the world egg.)».

We find the word *adhikaraṇa* only in the *Taittirīyopaniṣad* I.3.1.:

«*pañcasvadhikaraṇeṣu*».

«(We shall state the meditation of the juxtapositions) under five headings or in five substrata (through five means or subjects of knowledge)».

Again we may illustrate its working from, the *Nāsadiya Sūkta*:

«*kim-āvarivah kuha kasya śarmann*».

«Was it hid? Where? In whose enveloping care?» (v. 1.).

«*na mṛtyur āsīd-amṛtam na tarhi*».

«Then death was not; immortal life was not» (v. 2.).

«*kāmas-tadagre samavartatādhi*».

«In the beginning (Self delight, love and) desire evolved on that» (v. 4.).

«*Sato bandhum-asati niravindan*».

«(Poets) found there the bond of truth in illusion» (v. 4.).

«*Ko addhā veda ka iha pra vocat*».

«Who truly knows? Who here could proclaim...?» (v. 6.).

«yo asyādhyakṣaḥ parama vyoman».

«Only He in the highest heaven, who is of this the witness (knows whether He knows or not)» (v. 7.).

These four so called universals, though by no means always manifest in a sentence remain implied as 1) that from which or whom the action arises, 2) that to whom or which it is dedicated, 3) that by means of which or whom the action proceeds and 4) that in which, whether in time or space the action takes place. Undoubtedly these would be common to all Indo-european languages and one would hypothesis to all other languages.

In contrast the other two *kāraḥ* though capable of taking on a universal aspect, generally are relative to each other, though universally present in every sentence. In so far as the desire of the agent is a relative one so the *karṭṛ* and *karman* Agent and Object will partakes of this, in so far as he/she believes he/she is the doer of the action.

Thus the accusative in Western grammatical tradition is probably so named through a mistranslation by the Latin grammarian Varro of the Greek *aitiatike ptosis*, which appropriately means 'that which is acted upon', or the Object case (However even here we miss the depth of the *Pāṇinian* definition). Varro seems to have taken the Greek word as derived from *aitiaomai* (to accuse) and so passed on to us the misnomer «casus accusativus».

Pāṇini says «*karturīpsitatamaṃ karma* I.4.49. «That which is most desired to be obtained or beloved of the Agent is the *karman*».

Then by «*karmaṇi dvitīyā* II.3.2. he states «when the *karman*/ object (is not denoted by the terminations of the verb i.e. when the verb does not agree with it) the second case *sup vibhaktipratyayas am, aut* and *śas* act after a *prātipadika*». For example,

«*tad-dhāvato'nyān atyeti tiṣṭhan*» *Īśā.4.*

«While standing that (Self) overtakes other runners».

In the last analysis if we accept the *Vedānta* view, the Subject and Object are not separate but rather two ways of speaking of the one consciousness.

The first occurrence in the *Bṛhad* is at I.4.15.:

«*anyad-vā karmākṛtam ... mahatpunyam karma karoti ... na*

hāsyā karma kṣīyate...».

«(If one departs without realising the Self) being unknown it does not protect as the *Veda*) or any other *karman*/object or deed not undertaken... (Even if) he performs a great many meritorious acts or objects (those acts of his are surely exhausted in the end) (He who meditates only upon the world called the Self) never has his *karman* exhausted» (*Saṅkara* says this is because he has no *karman*/object/work because he does not desire anything other than the Self). Hence one might say at the universal level the *kartr* and *karman* would become one («*tattvam-asi*» «Thou art that». *Chandogya* VI.8.7 etc.).

Finally let us consider *Pāṇini's* exposition of the Subject, Agent or Nominative. While it is clear that the very language of Subject and Object speaks of a duality which the *Vākya* or *Śabda* transcends, nonetheless within the drama of the sentence, the Agent has the key relative function in relation to the action to be accomplished or made manifest.

Although it is said the discovery «*na kartāsi*» «Thou art not (in reality) the doer» is the key to the realization «*mukta evāsi sarvadā*». «Verily thou art ever free», the depth of *Pāṇini's* definition is nonetheless of universal value. He says «*svatantraḥ kartā*» I.4.54.

«He who holds the system within himself is the Agent (of the Absolute) for the purpose of the action or in relation to it, the independent one».

Pāṇini explains the peculiar nature of the first *vibhakti pratyayas* *su*, *au* and *jas* by the sūtra «*prātipadikārthalingaparimāṇavacanamātre prathamā*» II.3.46. «The first case is where the sense is only that of the *prātipadika* (i.e. crude form ready to enter the condition of *pada* in a sentence) or an additional sense of gender, or measure or number. «From which it is the meaning of agent and this sense is primarily conveyed either by the *tiṅ* verbal endings in the active voice, («*laḥ karmani ca bhāve cakarmakebhyaḥ*» III.4.69. «The *la* (tense *pratyayas* act after transitive *dhātus* in denoting the *karman* as well as the agent and after intransitives in marking the condition also as well as the agent») or by the third case ending in the passive by «*karṭṛkaraṇayos-tṛtīya*» II.3.18. This

is true even where the verb has to be supplied, as for example «*anejad-ekam manaso javīyaḥ*» Īśā 4. «(That Self is) unmoving one, faster than the mind».

Here *asti* is understood and the sense of agent is expressed by the *la ādeśa ti-p* by III.4.69.:

«... «*nainad-devā āpnuvan pūrvamarṣat*».

«The senses could not reach it. It ran ahead».

We find *karṭṛ* in the *Bṛhad* at IV.3.10:

«*Atha veśāntān puṣkarīṇiḥ sravantīḥ sṛjate sa hi kartā*».

«He creates the tanks, lotus pools and streams for he is the agent».

and again at IV.4.13.:

«*sa hi viśvakṛt sa hi sarvasya kartā tasya lokaḥ sa u loka eva*».

«For He is the maker of the univers for He is the maker of all, (all) is His Self/World». By means of the «*abhitā*» device P.2.3., *abhita* enables the *Brahma* to express *karṭṛ*, *karman*, *karaṇa*. (non perfettamente leggibile)

Finally we may see an example from the *Nāsadiya Sūkta* where the agency is conveyed by the verbal ending primarily and ensures a uniform treatment of passive conjunction + Nominative *sampradāna*, *āpadāna*, *adhikaraṇa* ending as *pratyadikastra* (P.2.3.46) and equivalent to subject and no read for separation notion of subject (compare J. FILLMORE, «The Case for Case», in *Universall of Linguistic Theory*). (non perfettamente leggibile)

«*na mṛtyur āsīd-amṛtam tarhi na ratryā ahna āsīt-praketa. ānīd-avātam svadhayā tad ekam tasmād-dhānyan-na paraḥ kim ca-nāsa*».

«Then death was not: immortal life was not: Nor any distinction fo night and day That One breathed. Of a certainty, beyond That was none other» (v. 2.).

In summary, we have put the rhetorical question «Does *Pāṇi-ni's Kāraka* system form the basis for a universal Grammar?» because we believe the formulation does indeed have a unique contribution to the understanding of the working of all languages. We have assumed a philosophical significance to lie behind the seven *Kāraka sūtras* because *Vyākaraṇa* is an *aṅga* limb or handmaid of the *Veda* serving to protect and explain its meaning. Hence the

order of the *sūtras* is taken as of great importance.

Kārake we have suggested really means in relation to the (one) activity having its source in the *Śabda brahman*. *Dhruvam* we have suggested is deliberately used because of its significance in the *Upaniṣads* as the Eternal Unmoving. The first four *kāra*kas: *apā-dāna*, *sampradāna*, *karaṇa* and *adhikaraṇa* it has been suggested directly link with the Universal principle expressing relationships essential to all human communication. Finally we treat *karṭṛ* and *karman* as more particular, mutually dependent and generally expressing a relative relationship of subject and object which in the last analysis would be realized as two ways of speaking of the One.

In conclusion we would propose that in view of the universal nature of Pāṇini's *kāraka* system and the consequent depth of understanding expressed, it would be of great benefit to the study of at least all other Indo-european languages and probably all other languages to adopt this system as the model against which others may be evaluated. Above all, the attention to the perfection of the *Sanskṛta* language as a guide to the nature of language in general would facilitate relating all study of language to the One, the Word or *Śabda-brahman* which is not only said to underlie all activity but to be the ultimate cause of all.